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    ⛵Dhow Dispatch │ The Parallel Internet: What Happens When a Country Builds Its Own Digital Economy

    Issue 34 · Focus: Iran's Technology & Digital Infrastructure

    September 10, 202619 min read
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    ⛵Dhow Dispatch │ The Parallel Internet: What Happens When a Country Builds Its Own Digital Economy

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    🚀 | TL;DR

    Iran has spent more than a decade building the infrastructure for a digital economy that can keep functioning when access to the global internet is restricted.

    That experiment is now operating at enormous scale.

    • Roughly 73 million Iranians are online, inside a country of around 90 million people.

    • Snapp has more than 90 million registered accounts and handled nearly 90% of Iran’s ride-hailing trips in its latest fiscal year.

    • Digikala moves roughly $1.2B to $1.3B of merchandise annually, reaches 40M to 45M monthly active users, and supports around 550,000 marketplace sellers.

    • Iran built domestic equivalents for major parts of the global technology stack, including payments, e-commerce, ride-hailing, app distribution, streaming, cloud infrastructure, travel, digital banking, BNPL and crypto.

    • The domestic payments system runs through Shetab and Shaparak, allowing tens of billions of electronic transactions without normal Visa or Mastercard connectivity.

    • Some of Iran’s largest technology companies operate at a scale that would support billion-dollar valuations in comparable markets. Their observed valuations remain dramatically lower. Digikala’s 2024 transaction implied roughly $441M to $484M, while a comparable-multiple exercise puts it above $2B. Tapsi was valued near $38M in a 2024 control transaction; the same exercise produces roughly $460M.

    • Internet isolation gives local platforms unusually strong domestic positions. It also restricts foreign capital, access to technology, international acquirers and viable exits.

    • Iran offers an extreme version of a much larger trend. Governments from India to China to the Gulf are treating payments, cloud, data and AI infrastructure as strategic national assets.

    Iran’s experience gives us a way to study what happens when a country tries to build a modern digital economy on its own rails.

    🧱 | How Iran Built a Parallel Internet

    Iran’s internet still connects to the global web. The architecture underneath it has become increasingly capable of operating without that connection.

    The project behind that capability is the National Information Network, or NIN.

    Plans for a domestic network date back more than a decade. By 2012, Iranian authorities were already building infrastructure that separated domestic traffic from international traffic. The eventual design included locally hosted websites, domestic data centers, Iranian digital services and centralized international gateways. The NIN was formally launched in 2016 and continued expanding through successive governments.

    The distinction became visible in November 2019.

    Iran cut international connectivity during nationwide protests. NetBlocks measured connectivity falling to roughly 4% to 5% of normal levels for several days. Some domestic websites and services continued functioning through the national network.

    That capability continued to develop.

    During the protests beginning in September 2022, authorities restricted Instagram, WhatsApp, app stores and circumvention tools. WhatsApp and Google Play were eventually unblocked in December 2024, while many other major international platforms remained filtered.

    Then came 2026.

    On January 8, internet traffic from Iran effectively collapsed. Cloudflare measured traffic falling close to zero for almost two weeks before a partial recovery began. Another nationwide shutdown started on February 28, with international traffic falling below 1% of previous levels.

    The economic costs became difficult to ignore.

    By April, Reuters reported that authorities had introduced a temporary “Internet Pro” program giving selected businesses broader access to the international internet. Iranian business groups estimated that the extended restrictions were costing the economy as much as $70M to $80M per day once indirect effects were included.

    Iran had effectively built a tiered network.

    Some traffic could remain inside the country. Selected users could receive greater outside access. Everyone else faced varying levels of filtering, instability and dependence on VPNs.

    📱 | Iran Rebuilt the Consumer Internet

    Once global technology companies become difficult to access, the economic opportunity becomes obvious.

    Someone still has to sell people products.

    Someone still has to move them around Tehran.

    Someone still has to process payments, host websites, stream television, distribute mobile apps and book flights.

    Iranian entrepreneurs filled those gaps.

    Digikala became the country’s dominant e-commerce platform.

    Snapp built ride-hailing and expanded into food delivery, grocery, travel, logistics, fintech and other services.

    Divar built the classifieds market.

    Cafe Bazaar and Myket became major Android distribution channels.

    Aparat built video distribution, with Filimo becoming a major streaming platform.

    Alibaba.ir built online travel.

    ArvanCloud developed domestic CDN, cloud and data infrastructure.

    Nobitex, Wallex and Bitpin built crypto exchanges.

    Iranian banks and fintechs built their own digital banking, payments, lending and BNPL products.

    Tehran Index now tracks hundreds of companies across more than 20 technology sectors. In its July registry analysis, fintech alone represented 40 of 212 fully mapped companies, almost twice the next-largest category at the time. Its broader company directory has continued expanding since.

    The interesting part is the scale some of these businesses reached.

    🦄 | The Unicorns Nobody Can Price

    Snapp closed its latest fiscal year with 90.3 million registered accounts.

    That number includes cumulative accounts rather than unique active people, so it should not be read as 90 million current users. Its operational numbers are more useful.

    Snapp reported an average 89.9% share of Iranian ride-hailing trips during FY2025-26. Its super-app was opened roughly 8.3 billion times during the year. The company operates across ride-hailing, food, grocery, travel, payments, and other services.

    There is no credible current market valuation for Snapp.

    Tehran Index tried to answer a different question: what would the business be worth if its operating metrics received valuation multiples similar to regional peers?

    Using Snapp’s disclosed trip volume and fares, it estimated around $1.8B of annual ride-hailing bookings. Applying a multiple below the one Uber paid for Careem produced roughly $3.3B for the ride-hailing business. Adding a conservative value for Snapp’s other businesses brought the modeled group value to approximately $4.3B.

    That is a hypothetical comparable valuation. Nobody has paid $4.3B for Snapp.

    Digikala gives us something more concrete.

    The company reports around 40M to 45M monthly active users, 10M to 11M active customers, roughly 550,000 marketplace sellers and approximately $1.2B to $1.3B of annual net merchandise value. Its broader group generated around 30.4 trillion toman of operating revenue in FY2024-25.

    In August 2024, Harkat Aval, the venture arm of Iranian mobile operator Hamrah-e Aval, bought roughly 40% of Digikala.

    Digikala said the agreed valuation was 30 trillion toman. Converted at the period exchange rate used by Tehran Index, that works out to roughly $484M. A separate analysis of the transaction produced an implied figure around $441M. Pomegranate Investment’s April 2025 portfolio mark implied approximately €563M for the group.

    Compare that operating scale with businesses in nearby markets.

    Trendyol reached a $16.5B valuation in 2021 at roughly 1.6x GMV. Hepsiburada went public at $3.9B at a similar multiple.

    Using a more conservative 1.2x GMV for Digikala’s marketplace and adding its fintech and other businesses, Tehran Index produced a modeled value above $2B.

    Tapsi makes the gap even more visible.

    The ride-hailing company is one of the few Iranian technology businesses with public financial statements. Golrang acquired roughly 69% in 2024 in a transaction that valued Tapsi at approximately $38M.

    Tapsi subsequently reported around 189 million annual trips and commission revenue growing 137% year over year. Applying a regional ride-hailing multiple to its estimated bookings produced a modeled value around $460M.

    So you get three very different numbers:

    Snapp: ~$4.3B modeled value, no observable current valuation

    Digikala: ~$441M to $484M transaction anchor, >$2B modeled value

    Tapsi: ~$38M transaction valuation, ~$460M modeled value

    The model is useful because it isolates one variable: what happens if Iranian operating metrics receive the same pricing framework as comparable companies elsewhere?

    The answer appears to be a very large gap.

    💳 | A Financial System Without Visa or Mastercard

    The most consequential part of Iran’s parallel technology stack may sit underneath the consumer apps.

    Iran does not participate normally in Visa or Mastercard’s global card networks.

    Consumers still expect to tap a card, buy something online, transfer money and pay a merchant.

    Iran built domestic infrastructure to make that possible.

    Shetab, introduced in 2002, connects Iranian banks and allows cards from one bank to work across the broader banking network.

    Shaparak sits over electronic acquiring and payment services, connecting merchants, payment service providers and banks through a centrally regulated domestic architecture.

    Together, these systems support tens of billions of electronic transactions each year.

    A full fintech ecosystem grew on top.

    Tehran Index currently tracks 178 fintech and crypto companies across 12 verticals. Its 2024-25 estimates put annual throughput through financial super-apps around $15.6B. Crypto exchanges handled an estimated $10B to $13B in annual trading volume, while wealth platforms held roughly $3.2B in assets.

    Digital banking has also reached meaningful penetration.

    Iranian digital-bank products now serve an estimated 20M to 22M people, close to a quarter of the population.

    BNPL passed roughly $1.2B of annual volume in 2024-25, according to Tehran Index’s industry work.

    This is where the parallel-internet thesis gets more interesting.

    A local video platform can lose users if YouTube becomes freely available.

    A payment rail embedded across banks, merchants and millions of consumers has a different kind of durability.

    The same applies to logistics networks, cloud infrastructure, merchant relationships and marketplace liquidity.

    These assets become harder to replace as the domestic economy builds around them.

    🏰 | The Economics of a Protected Tech Market

    Iran created an unusual competitive environment for startups.

    Global incumbents are absent or restricted across many categories. Domestic companies can reach national scale without competing directly against Amazon, Uber, Stripe or several other foreign platforms on equal terms.

    That gives local winners room to accumulate network effects.

    Digikala has spent years building fulfillment infrastructure and relationships with hundreds of thousands of sellers.

    Snapp has built driver liquidity and consumer distribution across hundreds of cities.

    Divar reported 53.1 million unique phone numbers and nearly 140 million ads in its FY2021-22 annual report. Even allowing for the age of that disclosure, the network is difficult for a new classifieds platform to replicate.

    Cafe Bazaar became deeply embedded in Iranian Android distribution. Third-party estimates have placed its share of domestic Android app installs above 90% in recent years, although install statistics from Iranian app stores are messy enough that Tehran Index now warns against treating them as active-user counts.

    The same environment creates heavy costs.

    International software and developer tools can become difficult to access.

    Hardware imports become more complicated.

    Global late-stage investors cannot easily enter.

    Companies have few international strategic buyers.

    Dollar returns get destroyed when the local currency depreciates faster than operating performance grows.

    Tehran Index estimates the free-market dollar moved from around 4,000 toman in 2017 to roughly 68,000 in 2024 and around 180,000 by mid-2026.

    That creates a brutal piece of startup math.

    A company can double revenue in local currency while becoming worth less in dollars.

    Pomegranate Investment offers a real example. Its audited Iranian technology portfolio fell roughly 36% in euro terms in the year ending April 2025, even as its largest holding, Digikala, reported revenue growth around 90%. Currency translation and the exchange rate used for valuation accounted for much of the divergence.

    The isolation that protects the company domestically also limits what its ownership can be worth internationally.

    📉 | The Isolation Discount

    Venture valuations depend on buyers.

    A company can have millions of users, strong growth, and attractive unit economics. Its shares still need somebody capable of buying them.

    That buyer universe is tiny in Iran.

    Tehran Index tracks 17 prominent investors in the Iranian innovation economy. Nine sit inside banks, telecoms, conglomerates or other financial institutions. None of the 17 publishes a conventional venture fund size. Sarava, the independent investor that backed companies including Digikala, Cafe Bazaar, Divar and Alibaba, reportedly wound down in January 2025.

    The exit market is thinner.

    Tehran Index recently reviewed audited filings from Iranian venture funds and found six exits with disclosed cost and proceeds. Together they returned 1.97x invested capital, with a median of 2.0x.

    Five of the six buyers were private individuals. One was a private company.

    The largest winner returned 9.1x. Several others returned around cost.

    The dollar values were tiny compared with conventional venture exits.

    A separate analysis of larger ownership changes found that completed acquisitions were overwhelmingly domestic. Pomegranate’s 2024 exit from Digikala did not immediately turn its equity into freely transferable foreign currency. The foreign shareholders instead received a deferred purchase claim from a local vehicle.

    This changes how we should think about the valuation discount.

    Part of it comes from currency.

    Part comes from sanctions and country risk.

    A large part comes from the absence of buyers who can create price competition.

    If an American startup has five global growth funds competing to lead its Series C, those investors help establish the market price.

    If the eventual buyer can be a U.S. public company, private equity fund, sovereign wealth fund or international strategic acquirer, that future exit value feeds back into what an investor will pay today.

    Iranian founders operate inside a much smaller capital loop.

    The company can be valuable.

    The equity can remain difficult to monetize.

    🔓 | What Happens If Iran Reconnects?

    This is where the thought experiment gets interesting.

    Imagine Iran eventually normalizes enough of its economic relationships for international technology companies and investors to participate more freely.

    Some domestic businesses would immediately face stronger competition.

    Consumer applications built primarily around the absence of a foreign product would have to defend themselves against that product.

    The infrastructure businesses would enter from a stronger position.

    Snapp already has drivers, consumers, restaurants, merchants and years of transaction history.

    Digikala already has sellers, logistics infrastructure, payments, fulfillment and brand awareness.

    Divar already has marketplace liquidity.

    Iranian payment rails are already integrated throughout the banking system.

    A global entrant would bring capital and technology. It would still need local distribution.

    That creates another possibility: international companies choose to partner with or acquire domestic incumbents instead of rebuilding the network themselves.

    The biggest re-rating could therefore happen in businesses whose domestic scale survives the arrival of foreign competition.

    A company with a strong product may gain access to capital.

    A company with a dense network may gain bargaining power.

    A company with both becomes strategically interesting.

    🌐 | One Internet Is Becoming Many Internets

    Iran is an extreme case.

    The larger trend is easier to see when you look elsewhere.

    China developed domestic search, commerce, payments, cloud, social networks, chips and AI while remaining deeply integrated into global trade. Gartner now describes the Chinese technology ecosystem as increasingly self-reinforcing and capable of reaching high levels of technological sovereignty by 2030.

    Russia has moved toward tighter domestic control over digital communications. In February, the country fully blocked WhatsApp while promoting the state-backed MAX messaging service.

    India offers another model.

    It built strategic domestic infrastructure while remaining open to international technology companies and capital.

    UPI processed 24.51 billion transactions worth ₹29.82 trillion, roughly $314B, in August alone. It is now accepted or integrated in 11 countries. India is exporting the infrastructure rather than isolating it.

    The Gulf is pursuing a fourth version.

    Saudi Arabia and the UAE are using sovereign capital to build enormous domestic AI and cloud capacity while partnering with American and other global technology companies.

    Saudi-backed HUMAIN is developing large-scale AI infrastructure, including a new 100 MW data-center project at NEOM. The UAE’s Stargate project plans an initial 1 GW AI cluster as part of a broader 5 GW campus built with G42, OpenAI, Oracle, Nvidia, Cisco and SoftBank.

    The underlying motivation keeps appearing in different forms.

    Governments increasingly care about where their data sits, who processes their payments, which companies provide their cloud, where AI models run and whether critical digital infrastructure can keep operating during a geopolitical shock.

    Gartner expects worldwide spending on sovereign-cloud infrastructure to reach roughly $80B this year, up 36% from 2025.

    OECD modeling gives the other side of the equation. Full fragmentation of global data flows could reduce global GDP by an estimated 4.5%.

    The economic opportunity sits somewhere between dependence and isolation.

    | What This Means for Early-Stage Investors

    The first lesson is that distribution becomes more valuable as markets become harder to enter.

    A startup with local regulatory knowledge, banking integrations, supply relationships and an existing user network can become the bridge an outside company needs to reach a market.

    The second lesson is about infrastructure.

    Consumer applications can grow very quickly when an incumbent disappears. The more durable value tends to form deeper in the stack, where payments, logistics, identity, cloud, data and marketplaces become embedded into how the economy functions.

    Iran gives us an unusually clear example because so much of the technology stack had to be built locally.

    The third lesson is about valuation.

    Operational scale alone does not determine what a startup is worth.

    The available capital base matters.

    Currency matters.

    Exit markets matter.

    Who can legally own the shares matters.

    Who can eventually buy them matters.

    Iran takes each of those variables to an extreme.

    That is how you end up with companies serving tens of millions of people while their observable equity values sit far below what similar operating metrics command in neighboring markets.

    🧭 | The Dhow Perspective

    The part of this story we find most interesting is the role infrastructure plays in determining where economic value accumulates.

    A community or country can consume technology built elsewhere.

    It can also own more of the rails through which its money, commerce, data and businesses move.

    Iran shows the extreme version of building those rails under constraint. India shows how domestic infrastructure can remain interoperable with the rest of the world. The Gulf is using sovereign capital to own more infrastructure while importing technology and talent.

    For us, the most compelling model is the one that combines ownership with openness.

    You want local networks strong enough to create distribution and bargaining power. You also want access to global capital, technology, customers and exit markets.

    That matters in venture too.

    A founder’s access to capital is part of the infrastructure around the company.

    Who controls that capital, where it comes from and which founders it reaches can shape an ecosystem for decades.

    ✅ | Bottom Line

    Iran has spent years building a digital economy that can operate increasingly independently from the global technology stack.

    That produced companies with enormous domestic reach.

    Snapp handles millions of trips a day.

    Digikala moves more than a billion dollars of merchandise annually.

    Domestic fintech companies move billions more through payment, lending, crypto and wealth products.

    The market also shows the cost of isolation in unusually clear numbers. Companies can grow quickly while their dollar valuations fall. Founders can dominate a category while losing access to global buyers. Investors can own successful businesses and still have few ways to turn those shares into liquid capital.

    The rest of the world is moving toward greater control over payments, cloud, AI, data and other strategic infrastructure.

    Iran gives us a view of how far that logic can go.

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    Sources

    • Tehran Index — “The Market Behind the Wall: A Field Guide to Iran’s Digital Economy”
      Core source for Iran’s population, internet penetration, startup count, major domestic platforms, payments architecture, and broader digital-economy map. Read source

    • Tehran Index — “Iran’s Hidden Unicorns”
      Used for Snapp, Digikala, and Tapsi valuation comparisons and modeled regional-comparable values. Tehran Index research hub

    • Tehran Index — “The Iran Fintech Landscape”
      Source for the 178 fintech and crypto companies tracked across 12 verticals, ~$15.6B in financial super-app throughput, $10B–$13B in crypto trading volume, and ~$3.2B in wealth-platform assets. Read source

    • Tehran Index — “Who Actually Funds Iranian Startups”
      Used for the structure of Iran’s venture ecosystem, corporate-backed investors, Sarava’s reported wind-down, and limited disclosure of fund sizes. Read source

    • Tehran Index — Digikala, Snapp, Divar, Cafe Bazaar and related company records
      Used for company-level operating metrics, transaction history, ownership, users, GMV, and valuation anchors. Tehran Index company database

    • Freedom House — “Iran: Freedom on the Net 2025”
      Historical context on filtering, platform restrictions, the domestic internet strategy, and access to the global web. Read source

    • Internet Society — “How War Restructured Iran’s Internet Into a Tiered and Monetized System”
      Source for the 2026 connectivity architecture, selective access, domestic routing, and emergence of a tiered internet system. Read source

    • Reuters — “Iran eases internet curbs for businesses as blackout enters third month”
      Used for the 2026 “Internet Pro” program and estimates of up to $70M–$80M in daily economic losses during prolonged restrictions. Read source

    • NetBlocks — Iran’s November 2019 internet shutdown
      Historical connectivity data showing national internet access falling to only a small fraction of normal levels while parts of the domestic network remained available. Read source

    • Gartner — “Worldwide Sovereign Cloud IaaS Spending Will Total $80 Billion in 2026”
      Used for the broader sovereign-cloud thesis and Gartner’s forecast of 35.6% annual spending growth. Read source

    • OECD — “Economic Implications of Data Regulation”
      Source for estimates that complete fragmentation of global data flows could reduce global GDP by roughly 4.5% and exports by 8.5%. Read source

    • Reuters — India’s UPI expansion
      Used for the comparison with India’s interoperable model. UPI processed 24.51B transactions worth approximately $314B in August 2026 and operates across 11 countries. Read source

    • Reuters — Russia blocks WhatsApp
      Used for Russia’s increasing substitution of foreign digital services with domestic alternatives. Read source

    • Reuters — HUMAIN and DataVolt Saudi data-center project
      Used for the Gulf comparison and Saudi Arabia’s investment in sovereign AI and compute infrastructure. Read source

    Private-company secondary pricing is indicative and may involve different share classes, rights, preferences, transaction structures, and liquidity conditions than a company's primary financing. Nothing in Dhow Dispatch should be construed as investment advice.

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